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Abstract
We show that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equi-
librium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover,
we show that every nite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has
a pure equilibrium. Further sucient conditions for existence are provided. We
point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the
class of relative payo games associated with symmetric two-player games. This
allows us to derive results on the existence of nite population evolutionary stable
strategies.
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Many zero-sum games do not have a solution without allowing for mixed strategies.
What is the class of zero-sum games possessing pure equilibria? Some answers to these
questions have been given by Shapley (1964) and Radzik (1991). For instance, Shapley
(1964) showed that a nite two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium if every 2x2
submatrix of the game has a pure equilibrium. Radzik (1991) showed that a two-player
zero-sum game whose columns are quasiconcave (i.e. single-peaked) and whose rows are
quasiconvex has a pure equilibrium if and only if every submatrix \along the diagonal"
has a pure equilibrium. Although both results apply to symmetric two-player zero-sum
games, none of their results exploits the symmetry property.
In this paper we are interested in pure equilibria of symmetric two-player zero-sum
games. It is well known that for instance the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure
equilibrium. We show that this holds more generally. We say that a symmetric two-player
zero-sum game is a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix (gRPS) if for each column
there exists a row with a strictly positive payo. This notion allows us to characterize
symmetric zero-sum games possessing pure equilibria. A symmetric two-player zero-sum
game has a pure equilibrium if and only if it is not a gRPS. Moreover, we show that
every nite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium.
We also provide sucient conditions for existence in terms of increasing and decreasing
dierences, potentials, and additive separability of payos. It turns out that symmetric
two-player zero-sum games are a very special class of games in which increasing and
decreasing dierences, the existence of an exact potential, and additively separable payos
coincide.
Symmetric two-person zero-sum games are often thought to be a very restricted class
that is less relevant to economics. However, in Section 3 we shall argue that they arise
naturally when relative payos of arbitrary symmetric two-player games are considered.1
The reason is simply that relative payo functions give rise to zero-sum games by con-
struction. Schaer (1988, 1989) introduced the notion of nite population evolutionary
stable strategies (fESS) and observed that a fESS of the original (arbitrary) symmetric
game coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the (zero{sum) relative payo game.2 Thus,
1There is some experimental evidence that players consider not only their absolute payos but also
relative payos. Early experiments include Nydegger and Owen (1974) and Roth and Malouf (1979).
More recently, relative payo concerns have been studied in behavioral economics and experimental
economics under the label of \inequity aversion".
2This relationship between Nash equilibrium and fESS has been analyzed for competitive games by
1when we apply our equilibrium existence results to the relative payo game, we also ob-
tain existence results for fESS of the underlying original game. This way, our results
can be applied for example to Cournot duopoly, Bertrand duopoly, public goods games,
common pool resource games, minimum eort coordination games, synergistic relation-
ships, arms race, Diamond's search, Nash demand game, or rent seeking. We also show
that a symmetric two-player game is an exact potential game if and only if its relative
payo game is an exact potential game. This is useful because the existence of an exact
potential of a symmetric zero-sum game is easy to verify.
The fESS of a game is of relevance when evolution operates in a nite (playing{the{
eld) population. It is also important because frequently it coincides with the stochas-
tically stable states of imitate-the-best dynamics.3 Thus, when players imitate in such
games, we should expect the outcome to be a fESS. The results developed here are also
used in our companion paper, Duersch, Oechssler, and Schipper (2010). There we char-
acterize the class of games in which \imitate-the-best" can not be exploited by any other
decision rule.
In the next section, we study the existence of pure equilibria in symmetric two-player
zero-sum games. In Section 3 we apply our results to relative payo games and the
existence of nite population evolutionary stable strategies.
2 Symmetric Zero-Sum Games
We consider a symmetric two{player game (X;), in which both players are endowed
with the same (nite or innite) set of pure actions X. For each player, the bounded
payo function is denoted by  : X  X  ! R, where (x;y) denotes the payo to
the player choosing the rst argument when his opponent chooses the second argument.
In this section we will restrict attention to zero-sum games. Symmetry and the zero-
sum property together imply then that (x;y) =  (y;x):4 Note that in a symmetric
zero-sum game, the payos on the main \diagonal" must be zero.
Denition 1 In a symmetric two-player zero-sum game (X;), a pair of strategies (x;y)
Ania (2008) and for \weakly competitive" games by Hehenkamp et al. (2010).
3See e.g. Al os-Ferrer and Ania (2005), Hehenkamp, Leininger, and Possajennikov (2004), Leininger
(2006), Matros, Temzelides, and Duy (2009), Possajennikov (2003), Schipper (2003), Tanaka (2000),
and Vega-Redondo (1997)
4The payo matrix of symmetric zero-sum game is skew-symmetric.
2is a pure equilibrium if (x;y) = maxx02X (x0;y) = miny02X (x;y0). A pure equilibrium
(x;y) is symmetric if x = y.
For obvious reasons, an equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games is often called a
\saddle point". In a symmetric game, if (x;y) is a pure equilibrium, so is (y;x). By the
rectangularity of equilibria in two-player zero-sum games, we also have that (x;x) and
(y;y) are pure equilibria. This yields the following known fact (see e.g. Nash, 1951).
Remark 1 A symmetric two-player zero-sum game (X;) has a pure equilibrium if and
only if it has a symmetric pure equilibrium.













This example can be generalized to the following class of games.
Denition 2 (Generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors Matrix (gRPS)) A symmetric zero-
sum game (X;) is a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix if in each column there exists
a row with a strictly positive payo to the row player i.e. if for all y 2 X there exists a
x 2 X such that (x;y) > 0.6
This denition allows us to provide a full characterization of pure equilibria in sym-
metric two-player zero-sum games.
Theorem 1 A symmetric two-player zero-sum game (X;) possesses a pure equilibrium
if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix.
Proof. If (X;) has no pure equilibrium (and in particular no pure symmetric equi-
librium), then for all y 2 X there is x 2 X such that (x;y) > (y;y) = 0: Thus, (X;)
is gRPS. Conversely, if (X;) has a pure equilibrium, by Remark 1 it has a symmetric
5The game was already described by von Neumann (1928, p. 303).
6In the nite strategy case, an alternative way of characterizing a gRPS game would be to say that
the game has a strictly positive minimax with respect to pure strategies i.e. if miny maxx (x;y) > 0:
3equilibrium. Thus, there is y 2 X such that (x;y)  (y;y) for all x 2 X, which implies
that (X;) is not gRPS.7 
A symmetric 2x2 zero-sum game cannot be a gRPS. If one of the row player's o-
diagonal relative payos is a > 0, then the other must be  a violating the denition of
gRPS. \Matching pennies" is not a counter-example because it is not symmetric. Thus
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Every symmetric 2x2 zero-sum game possesses a pure equilibrium.
In the following we shall study how several properties that are commonly assumed to
hold for games relate to the gRPS property.
Denition 3 (Quasiconcave) A symmetric two-player game (X;) is quasiconcave
(or single-peaked) if there exists a total order < on X such that for each x;x0;x00;y 2 X
and x0 < x < x00, we have that (x;y)  minf(x0;y);(x00;y)g:
That is, a symmetric game is quasiconcave if each column has a single peak.
Theorem 2 Every nite quasiconcave symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure
equilibrium.
The proof follows as a corollary from Theorem 1 and the following lemma.
Lemma 1 A nite quasiconcave symmetric two-player zero-sum game is not a gRPS.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that the nite quasiconcave symmetric zero-sum
game (X;) is a gRPS. Note rst that if (;y) is quasiconcave in the rst argument,
i.e., if x0 < x < x00 implies that (x;y)  minf(x0;y);(x00;y)g, then by symmetry,
(y;x)  maxf(y;x0);(y;x00)g, i.e. (x;) is quasiconvex in the second argument.
Let (xk;x`) be the left-most cell with a strictly positive entry that is above the main
diagonal, i.e. (xk;x`) > 0, where x` := argminx00 f(x0;x00) > 0 and x00 > x0g and xk :=
argminx0 f(x0;x`)g. If there are several such entries in column x`, we choose without
loss of generality the lowest one. Such an entry exists since (X;) is a gRPS and nite
(i.e., the last column must have a strictly positive entry above the main diagonal).
7We thank the Associate Editor for suggesting this simple proof.
4By symmetry, (x`;xk) is below the main diagonal and (x`;xk) < 0. By quasiconcav-
ity, all entries in the column xk below x` are also negative, (x;xk) < 0, for all x > x`.
Since rows are quasiconvex, it follows that (x`;x)  0 for all x such that xk < x < x`.
The same holds for all lower rows, (x0;x)  0, for all x0 > x`;xk < x < x0. This denes
a \trapezoid" neg of payo entries below the diagonal that does not contain any strictly
positive entries.
Now, look specically at column x` 1. neg contains all entries in this column that
are below the diagonal. However, this column must have a positive entry since the game
is a gRPS. Therefore, the column has to have a positive entry above the diagonal. But
this is a contradiction to the fact that (xk;x`) is the left-most cell with a positive entry
above the main diagonal. 
Note that if the nite zero-sum game is not symmetric but quasiconcave, then it does
not need to have a pure equilibrium. A counter example is presented in Radzik (1991, p.
26). Hence, symmetry is crucial for the result.
The converse to Theorem 2 is not true as the following example shows.
Example 1 Consider the following \Rock-Paper-Scissors" game augmented by an addi-
tional strategy \B".








0  1 1  1
1 0  1  1
 1 1 0  1




Clearly, it is not a gRPS since for column \B" there fails to exist a row yielding a strictly
positive payo. Thus, the game possesses a pure equilibrium, (B;B). Yet, no matter how
strategies are ordered, the game fails to be quasiconcave. Hence, there are symmetric
two-player zero-sum games that are neither generalized rock-paper-scissors games nor
quasiconcave.
Other \second-order" conditions are commonly explored in the literature when ana-
lyzing the existence of pure equilibria. We will consider increasing and decreasing dif-
ferences, additive separability, and potentials. Surprising to us, it turns out that for
symmetric two-player zero-sum games these conditions are all equivalent.
Denition 4 (Increasing and decreasing dierences) Let X be a totally ordered
set. A payo function  has decreasing (resp. increasing) dierences on X  X if










 is a valuation if it has both decreasing and increasing dierences.8
Denition 5 (Additively Separable) We say that a payo function  is additively
separable if (x;y) = f(x) + g(y) for some functions f;g : X  ! R.
Potential functions are often useful for obtaining results on convergence of learning
algorithms to equilibrium, existence of pure equilibrium, and equilibrium selection. The
following notion of potential games was introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Denition 6 (Exact potential games) The symmetric two-player game (X;) is an
exact potential game if there exists an exact potential function P : X  X  ! R such
that for all y 2 X and all x;x0 2 X,9
(x;y)   (x
0;y) = P(x;y)   P(x
0;y);
(x;y)   (x
0;y) = P(y;x)   P(y;x
0):
Proposition 1 Let (X;) be an arbitrary symmetric two-player zero-sum game and X
be a totally ordered set. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i)  has decreasing dierences on X  X,
(ii)  has increasing dierences on X  X,
(iii)  is a valuation,
(iv)  is additively separable,
(v) (X;) has an exact potential.
8For the two-dimensional case, increasing dierences are equivalent to supermodularity, so the two
terms can be used interchangeably (see Topkis, 1998, Chapter 2.6).
9Given the symmetry of (X;), the second equation plays the role usually played by the quantier
\for all players\ in the denition of potential games.
6Proof. Let X be a totally ordered set such that  has decreasing dierences on X X








Since (X;) is a symmetric two-player zero-sum game, (x0;x) =  (x;x0) for all x;x0 2
















Hence (i) if and only if (ii). (iii) follows from the equivalence of (i) and (ii).
By Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.6.4.), a function (x;y) is additively separable on XX
if and only if (x;y) it is a valuation. Thus, (iii) if and only if (iv).
Br^ anzei, Mallozzi and Tijs (2003, Theorem 1) show that a zero-sum game is an exact
potential game if and only if it is additively separable. Hence, (iv) if and only if (v). 
Corollary 2 Let (X;) be a symmetric two-player zero-sum game for which X is nonempty
compact subset of a topological space and  is upper semicontinuous. If (X;) satises
any of the properties (i) to (v) of Proposition 1, then a pure equilibrium exists.
Proof. Since X is compact and  is upper semicontinuous, any player's best response
correspondence of (X;) is nonempty by Weierstrass' Theorem. Since  is additively
separable under any property (i) to (v) by Proposition 1, the best response correspon-
dence is constant. Thus, a pure equilibrium of (X;) exists. 
For the remainder of this section, we consider the relationships between the results.
Corollary 2 is implied by Theorem 2 if nite games are considered.
Remark 2 Let X be a totally ordered set. If the symmetric zero-sum game (X;)
satises any of the properties (i) to (v) of Proposition 1, then (X;) is quasiconcave.
Proof. If property (iv) holds then there are some functions f;g : X  ! R such
that (x;y) = f(x) + g(y) for all x;y 2 X. Then (X;) is quasiconcave if and only
if f(x)  min[f(x0);f(x00)]: Since X is a totally ordered set, we can order it such that
7x0  x if and only if f(x0)  f(x). Thus, (X;) is quasiconcave: 
The converse is not true as the following example shows.












This game is quasiconcave but its payo function is not a valuation, i.e., payo dierences
in own strategies are not constant in the opponent's strategies.
Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 overlap in the important case of 2x2 games. It is straight-
forward to check that every symmetric 2x2 zero-sum game is quasiconcave and satises
all of the properties (i) to (v) of Proposition 1.
3 Application to Relative Payo Games
Consider now more generally a symmetric two-player (not necessarily zero-sum) game
(X;). When instead of the payo function  the relative payos are considered, then
symmetric two-player games give naturally rise to the class of symmetric zero-sum games.
Denition 7 (Relative payo game) Given a symmetric two-player game (X;), the
associated relative payo game is (X;), where the relative payo function  : XX  !
R is dened by
(x;y) = (x;y)   (y;x):
The relative payo of a player is the dierence between his payo and the payo of
his opponent.
Remark 3 Every relative payo game is a symmetric zero-sum game. Conversely, for
every symmetric zero-sum game, there is a symmetric two-player game for which the
relative payo game is the symmetric zero-sum game.
10We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
8Proof. Note that by denition, (x;y) = (x;y)   (y;x) =  [(y;x)   (x;y)] =
 (y;x) and hence (X;) is a symmetric zero-sum game. For the converse, if (X;) is a
symmetric zero-sum game, then (X;) with (x;y) = 1
2(x;y) is a symmetric two-player
game for which (X;) is the relative payo game. To see this, note that since (X;) is
a symmetric zero-sum game, we must have that (X; 1
2) is a symmetric zero-sum game.





where the last equality follows from the fact that (X; 1
2) is a symmetric zero-sum game.

The remark shows that every relative payo game is a symmetric zero-sum game,
and that relative payo games do not impose any restriction on the class of symmetric
zero-sum games. Every symmetric zero-sum game is a relative payo game of some
symmetric two-player game. Note also that dierent symmetric two-player games may
have the same relative payo game.
What outcomes in a symmetric two-player game correspond to pure equilibria in its
associated relative payo game? To answer this question we introduce the notion of
nite population evolutionary stable strategy (Schaer, 1988, 1989). This concept is
appropriate when \playing the eld", i.e. when players are matched against all other
players except themselves.
Denition 8 (fESS) A strategy x 2 X is a nite population evolutionary stable strat-
egy (fESS) of the game (X;) if
(x
;x)  (x;x
) for all x 2 X: (2)
In terms of the associated relative payo game, inequality (2) is equivalent to
(x
;x)  0 for all x 2 X:
Schaer (1988, 1989) observed that x is a fESS of the symmetric game (X;) if and
only if (x;x) is a pure Nash equilibrium of the relative payo game (X;).11
Our results in Section 2 provide existence results for fESS of (X;) when conditions
are imposed on the associated relative payo game (X;). That is, a symmetric game
(X;) has a fESS if and only if its associated relative payo game (X;) is not a
gRPS. In particular, every symmetric 2x2 game has a fESS. Furthermore, if the relative
11See Ania (2008) and Hehenkamp, et al. (2010) for further discussion.
9payo function  associated to a nite game (X;) is quasiconcave, then a fESS exists.
Finally, if the relative payo game (X;) associated to (X;) satises the properties of
Corollary 2, then a fESS exists.
There is an interesting connection between symmetric two-player games and their
relative payo games with regard to the existence of an exact potential function.
Theorem 3 Let (X;) be a symmetric two-player game with the associated relative pay-
o games (X;). (X;) is an exact potential game if and only if (X;) is an exact
potential game.
Proof. If P is an exact potential function of a symmetric two-player game (X;),
then P is symmetric, i.e. P(x;y) = P(y;x) for all x;y 2 X. To see this note that P
being an exact potential (X;) implies for all x;y 2 X
(x;y)   (y;y) = P(x;y)   P(y;y) and
(x;y)   (y;y) = P(y;x)   P(y;y)
Hence P(y;x) = P(x;y).
Adding some suitable additional terms on both sides that by symmetry of P are equal
we obtain for all x;x0;y;y0 2 X
(P(x






0))   (P(y;x)   P(y
0;x)):
Since P is an exact potential function of (X;) we can rewrite this equation
((x


















Using the relative payo function , we obtain
(x




Thus  is a valuation which by Proposition 1 is equivalent to (X;) being an exact
potential game. 
Often it is rather dicult to verify the existence of an exact potential function. Theo-
rem 3 and Proposition 1 show that it is straight forward for symmetric two-player games.
10It is easy to verify whether the relative payo function associated with the symmetric
two-player game is a valuation.
Finally, the following two corollaries provide sucient conditions imposed on the
payo function  of the underlying game (X;) for the existence of a fESS.
Corollary 3 Consider a symmetric two-player game (X;) with a compact strategy set
X and a continuous payo function. If (X;) is an exact potential game, then a fESS
exists.
The corollary follows since by Theorem 3 the relative payo game is also an exact
potential game. Hence, Corollary 2 implies the existence of a pure equilibrium of (X;),
which is a fESS of (X;).
Corollary 4 Consider a symmetric two-player game (X;) with a compact strategy set
X and a payo function that can be written as (x;y) = f(x) + g(y) + a(x;y) for some
continuous functions f;g : X  ! R and a symmetric function a : X  X  ! R (i.e.,
a(x;y) = a(y;x) for all x;y 2 X). Then (X;) has a fESS.
The corollary follows since (x;y) = f(x)+g(y)+a(x;y) implies that in the relative
payo game the term a(x;y) drops out, (x;y) = f(x)   g(y)   f(y) + g(x). Again,
Corollary 2 implies the existence of a fESS of (X;).
While at rst glance the condition on payos in the last corollary looks restrictive, it
is satised in many well-known textbook examples of two-player games including linear
Cournot duopoly, versions of Bertrand competition, public goods games, common pool
resource games, minimum eort coordination games, synergistic relationships, Diamond's
search, Nash demand game, and Tullock rent seeking games (for details see Duersch,
Oechssler, and Schipper, 2010). In applications, the function a is often symmetric because
it represents just the sum or the product of players' strategies.
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